Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Australian Information Security Management
Conference

Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events

2017

The 2017 homograph browser attack mitigation survey
Tyson McElroy
Edith Cowan University

Peter Hannay
Edith Cowan University

Greg Baatard
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism
Part of the Information Security Commons
DOI: 10.4225/75/5a84f5a495b4d
McElroy, T., Hannay, P., & Baatard, G. (2017). The 2017 homograph browser attack mitigation survey. In Valli, C.
(Ed.). (2017). The Proceedings of 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference, 5-6 December,
2017, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. (pp.88-96).
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism/210

THE 2017 HOMOGRAPH BROWSER ATTACK MITIGATION SURVEY
Tyson McElroy1,2, Peter Hannay1,2, Greg Baatard2
Security Research Institute, 2 School of Science, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia
tjmcelro@our.ecu.edu.au, p.hannay@ecu.edu.au, g.baatard@ecu.edu.au

1

Abstract
Since their inception, International Domain Names (IDN) have allowed for non-Latin characters to be entered
into domain names. This feature has led to attackers forging malicious domains which appear identical to the
Latin counterpart. This is achieved through using non-Latin characters which appear identical to their Latin
counterpart. This attack is referred to as a Homograph attack. This research continues the work of Hannay and
Bolan (2009), and Hannay and Baatard (2012), which assessed the mitigation methods incorporated by web
browsers in mitigating IDN homograph attacks. Since these works, time IDN mitigation algorithms have been
altered, such as the one used in Mozilla Firefox (Gerv, 2017). This study evaluates browser homograph attack
mitigation strategies in browsers released post-2011. In this study, we find a high level of effective multi-script
mitigation across the browser families surveyed. Notable exceptions to this include a single version of Firefox in
which the mitigation features were not present and ongoing omission of mitigation against single script attacks.
Keywords: IDN, homograph, homoglyph, internationalised domain names, browser security, phishing

BACKGROUND
Domain name resolution is a technology which allows for IP addresses to be encoded as a string of characters. In
the early days of Domain Names, the technology only accepted a string of alphanumeric ASCII characters as input
for domain names (Mockapetris, 1987). This limitation prevented international users from accessing certain
domains in their respective languages. The introduction of IDNs allowed for specific domain names to be
accessible to multiple languages through encoding domain names in the Unicode format ("Introduction to IDNs,"
2016).
The proposed IDN solution made use of UTF-8 character encoding to allow for non-latin characters to be
displayed. In order to enable existing DNS infrastructure to handle UTF-8 domains a system known as Punycode
was developed. Punycode provides facility to represent IDNs as regular ASCII domain names, as such no changes
are required for the majority of infrastructure (Costello, 2003). An example of an IDN would be the domain name
☃.com, which would be represented as xn--n3h.com when converted to punycode.
IDN’s have allowed for domains to be accessible from many global users. However, the use of Unicode characters
has also allowed for phishing attacks to be possible against domain names (Spaulding, Upadhyaya, & Mohaisen,
2016). The use of non-Latin characters in the domain names allowed users to enter Unicode characters which
appeared identical to the Latin counterpart, an example of this concept is shown in Figure 1 (Krammer, 2006). As
a method to counteract these threats, Domains adopted a system known as Punycode to translate any Unicode
characters into their ASCII representation ("Introduction to IDNs," 2016). Many browsers have adopted this
technology, allowing users to see when a non-ASCII character is entered into a domain name.

ɡ

U+0047
Latin Small Letter G

g

U+0261
Latin Small Letter Script G

Figure 1 - Example of Homoglyph for "g"
IDN’s have continued to see considerable growth and development in recent years ("Key Numbers," 2016),
reported that from 2010 to 2015, the total number of registered IDN’s had doubled to 6.8 million. Despite browsers
incorporating mitigation actions against IDN phishing attacks, they still pose a significant threat. In 2017 browsers
such as Firefox, Google, Chrome and Opera were found to be vulnerable to a Punycode exploit (Kumar, 2017).
This attack was possible due to a domain registration exploit, which allows the user to register a domain name in
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Punycode format with foreign ASCII characters which appear identical to legitimate domains (Tseng, Ku, Lu,
Wang, & Geng, 2013).
In the Wild Phishing Attacks using IDN Homographs
There have been numerous websites aiming to educate the public about the dangers of IDN homograph attacks,
including еріс.com, аррӏе.com, and gooɡle.com (Hannay, 2012; Maunder, 2017; Zheng, 2017). However, the
occurrence of homograph usage in confirmed phishing campaigns has been relatively minor with only a single
confirmed major incident. In August the domain adoḅe.com was registered, subsequently the domain was used to
distribute the Beta Bot malware, disguised as an update to the Adobe Flash Player software (Mimoso, 2017).
Links to the website were distributed via email and Skype messages, requesting that the user install the fabricated
update. Post infection the malware disables security software, then steals financial data and user credentials
(Kaspersky Lab, 2017).

PREVIOUS WORK
Since the introduction of IDN’s, many attacks have been possible due to the use of non-ASCII characters. The
following literature review gives a brief overview of the types of attacks due to the introduction of IDNs. Table 1
provides an overview of of the types of attacks, covering single script, mixed-script, and whole script spoofing
attacks which can take place through character substitution.
Script Type
Single Script
Mixed Script
Whole Script

Table 1 – Examples of Single Script, Mixed Script, and Whole Script Spoofing
String
Punycode
Comments
EPlC.com EPlC.com
Lowercase L used as replacement for
uppercase I
еpic.com
xn--pic-qdd.com
Cryllic replacement used for ‘e’
еріс.com
xn--e1awd7f.com
Cryllic replacements used for ‘epic’

Mixed-Script Spoofing
One of the most prevalent attacks which have been proven possible by IDN domains is mixed-script spoofing.
Mixed-script spoofing generates domain names using visually indistinguishable characters form different script
groups (Krammer, 2006). These characters appear almost the same to the end user but contain different Unicode
values. These characters exist within Unicode due to the writing system being used, letter and number encodings,
and legacy encoding values (Davis & Suignard, 2006). These visually indistinguishable characters are known as
Homoglyphs. Due to the indistinguishable nature of certain Unicode characters, attackers can easily forge domain
names which appear to be visually indistinguishable from other legitimate domain names. These domain names
are referred to as holographs, as they are comprised of various characters from separate scripts. Homographs can
be used to trick users into going to a malicious domain and as such have been used in various phishing schemes.
Whole-Script Spoofing & Single-Script Spoofing
Whole script spoofing and single script spoofing differ from the mixed-script spoofing approach. Due to the
introduction of IDNs, entire domain names can be spoofed through substituting each character in a domain with
one of a different script (Krammer, 2006). This attack relies on each character in a domain name having an
indistinguishable counterpart in another script. Attackers can utilise this coincidence to generate a fully
indistinguishable domain name. Another attack possible is single script spoofing. This attack uses characters from
the same script to visually trick users into going to the domain (Gelernter & Herzberg, 2016). These attacks are
more recognisable to end users, as attackers are not substituting Unicode character from different scripts
(Krammer, 2006). Instead, domain names are constructed using characters which appear somewhat identical to
their counterparts. An example of this is Latin ‘o’ and ‘0’, which can be used to forge the domain
‘www.g00gle.com’.

DEFENCE TECHNIQUES
Various defence mechanisms were adopted to address the security issues arising from the introduction of IDNs.
The most prevalent defence against homograph attacks is displaying Unicode characters in a Punycode format.
Punycode is used to encode a Unicode string into its appropriate ASCII string representation (Costello, 2003).
Punycode values are prefixed with xn-- to represent the Unicode string. Values which contain ASCII characters
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are interpreted as literal strings; however Unicode characters are transformed into their ASCII interpretation
(Costello, 2003).
Web Browser Defence
As a means of defence against homograph threats, web browsers have begun implementing defence measures to
notify users of potential issues with the domain name. One mitigation technique employed by Internet Explorer 7
is to display Punycode when mixed-script characters are detected in the domain name (Al Helou & Tilley, 2010).
Another defensive technique which browsers incorporate is colour coding particular scripts. This technique shows
characters in different colours based on the script to which they belong.
Another technique incorporated by Mozilla and Safari is to use a whitelisting approach. This security measure
displays all IDNs in Punycode unless the domain is registered under a Top Level Domain (TLD) which has
policies in place to prevent spoofing of the domain. As a requirement for this registering the domain with
Homoglyphs, the owner must already own the western equivalent of the domain name. Mozilla Firefox still retains
this whitelisting approach for handling IDNs but has since updated how the Punycode display works in 2012
(Gerv, 2017). The new algorithm employed determines if the entered domain name contains characters belonging
the same script or if the characters are being pulled from one of the allowed predefined script combinations (Gerv,
2017). If the entered domain name is not within the pre-established whitelist for TLDs or if the domain name is
using characters from illegal script combinations, a Punycode sample is displayed to the user. The previous
whitelisting approach only remains for compatibility purposes with the domains registered with it but is no longer
the primary method used for Homograph mitigation (Gerv, 2017). Some browsers such as Opera still retain the
previous whitelisting approach which Firefox has since abandoned, but remains active for compatibility purposes
with the registered domains.
In the Hannay and Baatard (2012) survey, various browsers were assessed to determine their effectiveness in
mitigating Homograph attacks. In this previous study, numerous versions of the web browsers Mozilla Firefox,
Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Opera, and Safari were assessed regarding the mitigation techniques used
against homograph attacks. The results from the previous study demonstrated that later versions certain browsers
such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox were highly effective in mitigating homograph attacks, while the
latest versions of Internet Explorer and Safari were still vulnerable to some attacks at the time of the study.
In recent versions of browsers such as Firefox, the algorithm used to display Punycode has been altered. This
modification indicates that later versions may not have the same homograph mitigation methods applied. This
research updates the results seen in the Hannay and Baatard (2012) study by analysing the mitigation techniques
adopted by browser versions released between 2011 and 2017. Through performing this investigation, the author
answers the question of if mitigation techniques have been applied to browser versions post-2011 and if changes
to the mitigation functions resulted in further vulnerabilities with certain versions.

RESEARCH METHOD
The testbed used for this investigation consists of a virtual machine running Windows 7 and an Ubuntu 14.04
Desktop virtual machine hosting sites containing single and mixed-script domain name. Various versions of the
web browsers Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, Internet Explorer, and Opera were installed on the Windows 7 virtual
machine. The versions which are tested consist of various versions from 2011 to 2017, which were not covered
in the 2012 study. Due to issues obtaining previous versions of Google Chrome, the Chromium browser is used
for this research. Given the total quantity of browser versions released per year, the versions covered in this
research consist of those releases mid-year and at the end of the year. As a means of managing the browser versions
installed on the tested, a snapshot is taken before any browser is installed on the environment. After each browser
version is tested, the virtual environment is rolled back to the base install to prepare for the next iteration of testing.
Table 2: Test Domain Names
Domain Name Character Set

Domain Name

Single-Script

n0tasecuresite.com

Mixed-Script

nоtasecuresite.com

To perform this test in a controlled environment, two distinct websites were created, these were hosted on an
Apache web server. The domain names of these sites were configured to use single-script and mixed-script
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characters. The domain names used in the test are shown in Table 2. The single-script domain uses the Latin
character ‘0’ in place of an ‘o’, while the mixed-script site uses the U1086 Cryllic ‘о’ character. These sites are
also using self-signed Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates which also correspond to the single-script and
mixed-script characters used in the domain names. Finally, both the sites are configured to use Geolocation
services which prompt the user to share their current location with the given domain. Through hosting websites
using single-script and mixed-script character sets, It is possible to assess the mitigation techniques applied to the
two domains securely.
To test the effectiveness of the mitigation methods applied to each browser version, four common attack vectors
were identified corresponding to browser locations where the output is either the standard Unicode format or
Punycode. This mitigation tactic is used to convey information to the user, regarding if any non-standard ASCII
characters are detected. Through assessing various browser features, the research demonstrates how effective each
browser is in conveying this information to the end user. These attack vectors used in this investigation are:


The text shown in the browser’s address bar, after the “Go” (or equivalent) button has been pressed.



The text shown in the browser’s status bar while the mouse is hovering over a hyperlink.



The text shown when viewing prominent information about the website’s SSL certificate.



The text shown when the user is prompted to share their location using geolocation services.

As a means to assess how effective each browser version is with mitigating homograph attacks, a revised
mitigation rating table similar to those presented in the 2012 study is provided. A value of zero was assigned
should the browser not support a particular attack vector, for example, geolocation services. A value of negative
one is given if a browser has implemented an attack vector, but is still open to homograph attacks. A value of
positive one is given if a browser has implemented an attack vector and mitigated homograph attacks. Should the
browser support or not support mitigation methods when displaying text in the browsers address bar, a value of
positive two or negative two is given for this value. This value is due to this vector being the most prominent
location for displaying Punycode. The browsers will receive two distinct ratings for single script and mixed-script
mitigation. An example of the table used can be viewed in Table 3.

Address Bar
-2 (No mitigation)
0 (No Support)
+2 (Mitigated)

Table 3: Mitigation Table Structure
Status Bar
SSL Certificate
-1 (No mitigation)
-1 (No mitigation)
0 (No Support)
0 (No Support)
+1 (Mitigated)
+1 (Mitigated)

Location Request
-1 (No mitigation)
0 (No Support)
+1 (Mitigated)

RESULTS
The post-2011 versions of Internet Explorer, as shown in Table 4, demonstrated improvements to mitigating
Homograph attacks. Following the introduction of geolocation services in version 9, version 10 incorporated a
Punycode mitigation method for mixed-script attacks. Internet Explorer has yet to implement a method of
displaying Punycode for the SSL certificate, therefore not all mitigation methods have been implemented in the
browser as of yet. Internet Explorer provides no method of mitigating against single script attacks, as no
notification was given when supplementing a Latin ‘o’ and a ‘0’.
As with Internet Explorer, single-script mitigation techniques are not present in any version of Firefox shown in
Table 5. Version 17 of Firefox was not capable of displaying any form of Punycode in the address bar, SSL
certificate, or geolocation request. This finding was likely a bug with versions from that time span, as this issue
was later fixed. The only other issue with later Firefox versions was a lack of geolocation support present in
version 26.
These results of Table 6 show that the Opera browser is highly effective in detecting mixed-script IDNs and
implementing appropriate mitigation methods to notify the users. As with the other browsers, no support for
mitigating single script spoofing has been implemented yet.
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Version &
Release Date
10 (2012 - 09)
11 (2013 - 10)

Table 4: Internet Explorer Mitigation Table
Address Bar
Status Bar
SSL
Location
Mitigation
Mitigation
Certificate
Request
Mitigation
Mitigation
Single Script –
Single Script –
Single Script –
Single Script –
No Mitigation
No Mitigation
No Mitigation
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode

Mixed-Script –
Punycode

Mitigation
Rating
-5

Mixed-Script –
No Mitigation

Mixed-Script –
Punycode

+3

Location
Request
Mitigation
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation

Mitigation
Rating

Version &
Release Date

Address Bar
Mitigation

13 (2012 – 06)

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation

Table 5: Firefox Mitigation Table
Status Bar
SSL
Mitigation
Certificate
Mitigation
Single Script –
Single Script –
No Mitigation
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Punycode
Single Script –
Single Script –
No Mitigation
No Mitigation

Mixed-script –
No Mitigation
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation

Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation

Mixed-script –
No Mitigation
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation

Mixed-script –
No Mitigation
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode
No support*

-3

Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode

Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode

Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode

No Support*

+4

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-Script –
Punycode

-5

17 (2012 – 11)

22 (2013 – 06)

26 (2013 – 12)

30 (2014 – 06)
34 (2014 – 12)
38 (2015 – 05)
43 (2015 – 12)
47 (2016 – 06)
50 (2016 – 11)
55 (2017 – 08)
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Version &
Release Date

Address Bar
Mitigation

12 (2012 – 06)

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Mixed-script –
Punycode

15 (2013 – 07)

Table 6: Opera Mitigation Table
Status Bar
SSL
Mitigation
Certificate
Mitigation
Single Script –
Single Script –
No Mitigation
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Punycode
Single Script –
Single Script –
No Mitigation
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Punycode
Mixed-script –
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Punycode

Location
Request
Mitigation
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
No Support

No Support

Mitigation
Rating
-5
+5
-4

+4

18 (2013 – 11)
22 (2014 – 06)
26 (2014 – 12)
30 (2015 – 06)
34 (2015 – 12)
38 (2016 – 06)
42 (2016 – 12)
47 (2017 – 08)

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Version &
Release Date

Address Bar
Mitigation

20.0.1123
(2012 – 05)
25.0.1323.1
(2012 – 11)
29.0.1541.0
(2013 – 06)
32.0.1700.6
(2013 – 11)
37.0.2017.2
(2014 – 05)
41.0.2243.0
(2014 – 12)
45.0.2431.0
(2015 – 06)
49.0.2593.0
(2015 – 12)
53.0.2763.0
(2016 – 05)

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

-5

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Support
Mixed-script –
No Support
Single Script –
No Support
Mixed-script –
No Support

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

-4

56.0.2902.0
(2016 – 10)

61.0.3153.0
(2017 – 09)

-5
Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Single Script –
No Mitigation
Mixed-script –
Punycode

Table 7: Chromium Mitigation Table
Status Bar
SSL
Location
Mitigation
Certificate
Request
Mitigation
Mitigation
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Mitigation
Rating
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The results from Table 7 show that Chromium is highly effective in mitigating against IDN homograph attacks.
Like the other browsers analysed, no support for single-script mitigation has been added to any version. Chromium
was shown to be highly consistent with the mitigation functions applied to each browser version. However, the
most recent version of the browser does not accurately convey SSL certificate information to the user. This
limitation results in the browser being unable to display Punycode for the domain name used in the SSL certificate.
The results from single-script mitigation are demonstrated in Figure 1. Given the lack of mitigation functions,
each browser received a negative mitigation rating. The most consistent rating across all browsers was a -5. The
versions which achieved a -4 rating were as a result of a lack of support for a given for that version.

Single-Script Mitigation Results
5
4
3
2
1
0
-12011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

-2
-3
-4
-5
Internet Explorer

Firefox

Opera

Chromium

Figure 2 - Single-Script Mitigation Results

Mixed-Script Mitigation Results

5
4
3
2
1
0
2012
-1

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

-2
-3
-4
-5
Internet Explorer

Firefox

Figure 3- Mixed-Script Mitigation Results
The results from mixed-script mitigation are demonstrated in Figure 2. The majority of browser versions
demonstrate consistent mitigation ratings across different releases. The drops in mitigation ratings appear to be
from certain versions not supporting for a particular feature. However, the 2012 version of Firefox is shown to
have the greatest drop in mitigation rating. This finding is a result of the version only displaying Punycode for the
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hover feature of Hyperlinks. The issues discovered in this version were later amended in later versions, with the
only other drop being the lack of geolocation support in the 2013 version. Internet Explorer has demonstrated a
greater mitigation rating in later versions by implementing geolocation services. Opera was shown to be the most
effective in implementing mitigation features for IDN homograph attacks, as it received the rating of +5 more
consistently than the other browsers tested.
The uptake rate of new browser versions plays a significant role in determining the potential exposure of any
particular browser version to hostile actors. A study conducted by Ion, Reeder, and Consolvo (2015) compared
the cyber security practices of expert and non-expert users. One major finding of the study was that largest point
of difference between the groups, was the importance placed on installing software updates in a timely fashion
(Ion et al., 2015). Examining W3Counter data on browser usage shows us that as of August 2017, that 25.84% of
users were running web browsers more than three months old (W3Counter, 2017). As such we can see that the
potential exposure for vulnerabilities in specific browser versions, such as those seen in Firefox in 2012, may span
many months from release of the software.

CONCLUSION
The results discovered in this research are representative of how IDN mitigation techniques have been
implemented in various browsers in recent years. In extending the results of the previous study by Hannay and
Baatard (2012), the results found in this study appear to indicate that mixed-script homograph attack mitigation
has become a standard feature for most browsers. The majority of browsers analysed in this study demonstrated
to implement appropriate mitigation techniques for IDN homograph attacks. The only degree of variance in the
mixed-script results appears to be with different versions of particular browsers, which could be a result of bugs
or changes in the algorithm. The results for single-script mitigation demonstrate that this is not a feature commonly
implemented in browsers. Of the browsers analysed, none provided any support to notify the end user about a
non-standard character being used in the domain name. This research suggests that mitigation against mixed-script
homograph attacks has become a common feature for most browsers, while implementation of mitigation
functionality for single-script spoofing attacks has not been undertaken.

REFERENCES
Al Helou, J., & Tilley, S. (2010). Multilingual web sites: Internationalized Domain Name homograph attacks.
Paper presented at the Web Systems Evolution (WSE), 2010 12th IEEE International Symposium on.
Costello, A. M. (2003). Punycode: A bootstring encoding of unicode for internationalized domain names in
applications (IDNA).
Davis, M., & Suignard, M. (2006). Unicode security considerations: Citeseer.
Gelernter, N., & Herzberg, A. (2016). Autocomplete Injection Attack. In I. Askoxylakis, S. Ioannidis, S.
Katsikas, & C. Meadows (Eds.), Computer Security – ESORICS 2016: 21st European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security, Heraklion, Greece, September 26-30, 2016, Proceedings, Part II (pp.
512-530). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Gerv. (2017, April 17th). IDN Display Algorithm. Retrieved from
https://wiki.mozilla.org/IDN_Display_Algorithm
Hannay, P. (2012). Google Awesome Edition. Retrieved from http://xn--goole-tmc.com/
Hannay, P., & Baatard, G. (2012). The 2011 IDN homograph attack mitigation survey. Paper presented at the
Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Management (SAM).
Hannay, P., & Bolan, C. (2009). Assessment of Internationalised Domain Name Homograph Attack Mitigation.
Paper presented at the Australian Information Security Management Conference.
Introduction to IDNs. (2016, July 3rd). Retrieved from http://idnworldreport.eu/introduction-to-idns/
Ion, I., Reeder, R., & Consolvo, S. (2015). "... No one Can Hack My Mind": Comparing Expert and Non-Expert
Security Practices. Paper presented at the SOUPS.
Kaspersky Lab. (2017). What is Beta Bot? Retrieved from https://usa.kaspersky.com/resourcecenter/definitions/beta-bot

Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference

95

Key Numbers. (2016, August 16th). Retrieved from http://idnworldreport.eu/facts-figures/number-of-idns-2/
Krammer, V. (2006). Phishing defense against IDN address spoofing attacks. Paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust: Bridge the Gap
Between PST Technologies and Business Services.
Kumar, M. (2017, April 17th). This Phishing Attack is Almost Impossible to Detect On Chrome, Firefox and
Opera. Retrieved. Retrieved from http://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishingattack.html
Maunder, M. (2017, April 14th). Chrome and Firefox Phishing Attack Uses Domains Identical to Known Safe
Sites. Retrieved from https://www.xn--e1awd7f.com/ &
https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2017/04/chrome-firefox-unicode-phishing/
Mimoso, M. (2017, September 6th). IDN Homograph Attack Spreading Betabot Backdoor. Retrieved from
https://threatpost.com/idn-homograph-attack-spreading-betabot-backdoor/127839/
Mockapetris, P. V. (1987). Domain Names-Concepts and Facilities RFC1034: IETF.
Spaulding, J., Upadhyaya, S., & Mohaisen, A. (2016). The landscape of domain name typosquatting:
Techniques and countermeasures. Paper presented at the Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES),
2016 11th International Conference on.
Tseng, S.-S., Ku, C.-H., Lu, A.-C., Wang, Y.-J., & Geng, G.-G. (2013). Building a Self-Organizing Phishing
Model Based upon Dynamic EMCUD. Paper presented at the Intelligent Information Hiding and
Multimedia Signal Processing, 2013 Ninth International Conference on.
W3Counter. (2017). Browser & Platform Market Share - August 2017. Retrieved from
https://www.w3counter.com/globalstats.php?year=2017&month=8
Zheng, X. (2017). IDN Homograph Example. Retrieved from http://xn--80ak6aa92e.com/

Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference

96

